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IN THE SUPREHE COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTHENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
---ooOoo---
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
IRA HATCH, dba Marble Motel; 
IRA HATCH, dba Sandman 
Motel; BERTHA C. JENSEN, dba 
Golden Spike Hotel, and 
HELE~ REEDER, et al., 
Defendants-Appellants. 
---ooOoo---
CASE NO. 16526 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
---ooOoo---
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal from orders of im-
mediate occupancy, granted in condemnation actions brought 
by the Utah Department of Transportation in regard to Appel-
lants' nonconforming outdoor advertising signs, pursuant to 
the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, section 27-12-136.1 et 
seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The First District Court, the Honorable VeNoy 
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Christofferson, Judge, granted Respondent's Motions for 
Orders of Immediate Occupancy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks a ruling of this Court affirming 
the decision of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June, July, and September, 1978, Respondent com-
menced condemnation actions against Appellants, seeking me 
removal of five outdoor advertising signs which have non-
conforming status under the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. 
Answers were filed in three of the actions on or about Octo· 
ber 17 and 18, 1978, and Respondent's Motions for Orders of 
Immediate Occupancy were filed December 11, 1978. Extensive i 
legal memoranda were filed by each side in February and 
March, 19 79, and hearing was held on the r.1otions on March 
26, 1979. The District Court, in its Memorandum Decision 
dated April 30, 1979, granted Respondent's Motions, and on 
May 23, signed Orders of Immediate Occupancy as to the five 
nonconforming signs in question. 
ARGUMENT 
The instant actions were brought pursuant to the Uta:l 
Outdoor Advertising Act, U.C.A. 27-12-136.1 et seq., which 
provides for the regulation of outdoor advertising adjacent , 
to interstate and primary highways. The Utah Act was promu:·l 
gated in response to federal legislation which encouraged 
-2-
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states to provide for the "effective control" of such ad-
vertising, at the peril of losing up to ten percent of 
federal highway funding. 23 U.S.C. l3l(b). The federal 
law also sets out guidelines for the effective control of 
outdoor advertising; and for the removal of.illegal and 
nonconforming signs. 23 U.S.C. 13l(c) et seq. Respondent 
is empowered to acquire nonconforming signs by eminent do-
main under U.C.A. 27-12-136.11, a section of the Utah Act. 
I. 
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY IS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR 
UNDER THE UTAH OUTDOOR ADVERTISING ACT, AND IS 
AN APPROPRIATE MEASURE TO BE CONSIDERED IN CON-
DEMNATION ACTIONS BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THAT ACT. 
As a threshold matter, it should be stressed that the 
provision which grants the State the right of eminent domain 
as to nonconforming advertising signs expressly incorporates 
the chapter which allows the granting of orders of immediate 
occupancy. U.C.A. 27-12-136.11 states: 
y 
The [transportation].!/ commission is hereby 
empowered and authorized to acquire by gift, 
purchase, agreement, exchange or eminent do-
main, any existing outdoor advertising and all 
property rights pertaining to same which were 
lawfully in existence on May 9, 1967, and 
U.C.A. 27-12-136.3(1) defines "commission" as "the state 
road commission of Utah." Under U.C.A. 63-49-4(2) (a), 
all "functions, powers, duties, rights and responsibil-
ities" of the state road commission were subsequently 
transferred to the Utah Department of Transportation. 
-3-
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which by reason of this act become noncon-
forming •..• Eminent domain shall be exer-
cised in accordance w1th the prov1s1on of 
chapter 34 of Title 78. (Emphasis added.) 
The statute which provides that orders of immediate occu-
pancy may be obtained by condemning entities is U.C.A. 
78-34-9, one of the provisions of chapter 34 of Title 78. 
It must be presumed that the clear language of the statute 
means what it says, and t.hat the provisions of chapter 34 
of Title 78, including section 78-34-9, govern exercises 
of the eminent domain power under U.C.A. 27-12-136.11. 
It is thus apparent that the Legislature intended 
immediate occupancy to be available for the courts' consid· 
eration in condemnations of nonconforming signs, subject 
to the requirements set out in U.C.A. 78-34-9. 
II. 
RESPONDENT FULFILLED THE STATUTORY AND CASE 
LAI'i REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ORDER OF IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY, AND THE LOvJER COURT COULD, THERE-
FORE, IN ITS DISCRETIOH, PROPERLY GRANT AN 
ORDER OF IID!EDLZ\.TE OCCUPANCY. 
As to the proof to be considered in a trial court's 
consideration of a motion for an order of immediate occu-
pancy, U.C.A. 78-34-9 provides: 
The court or of judge thereof shall take proof 
by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the 
premises sought to be condemned and of the dam-
ages which will accrue from the condemnation, 
-4-
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and of the reasons for requiring a speedy oc-
cupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion 
according to the equity of the case and the 
relative damages which may accrue to the parties. 
In addition, where a condemnor's right to take is centro-
verted, this Court has previously stated that the condemnor 
may be required to make a prima facie showing of its right 
to take, prior to issuance of the order. Utah Copper 
Company v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated ~tining Company, 69 
Utah 423, 255 P. 672 (1926). 
In the present cases, Respondent made a prima facie 
showing of its authority to take, a showing not seriously 
controverted by Appellants; and submitted proof of the value 
of the condemned signs and of the reasons for a speedy occu-
pation. It was therefore well within the lower court's dis-
cretion to grant the orders of immediate occupancy, as it 
did. 
A. 
RESPONDENT MADE A CLEAR PRIMA FACIE SHOWING 
THAT, AS A HATTER OF LA1'7, IT HAS A VALID 
RIGHT TO CONDEMN APPELLANTS' NONCONFORMING 
SIGNS. 
In the Answers filed in these cases, Appellants 
raised a number of constitutional and other legal objections 
to Respondent's right to condemn the subject signs. Mindful 
that it may be required to make a prima facie showing of its 
-5-
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authority to condemn, Respondent addressed each of the 
constitutional and legal objections at length in its 
Memorandum in Support of Hotion for Order of Immediate 
Occupancy (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff's 
Memorandum,") and further responded to the Defendants' 
legal arguments in its l-1emorandum in Reply to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition (hereinafter referred to as "Plain-
tiff's Reply Memorandum.") Appellants now argue that the 
hearing on the motion was not the proper forum for determi-
nation of the constitutional issues, and that evidence 
needs to be presented on these issues (Appellants' Brief, 
pp. l6f.). Respondent has some difficulty understanding 
the pertinency or timeliness of this argument, since any 
party was free to present whatever evidence or make what-
ever argument it wished in the hearing before the lower 
court. Respondent submits that, as a matter of law, Appel-
lants' constitutional arguments are uniformly without merit 
and that the district court properly ruled that Respondent 
has the right to condemn the subject signs. 
Respondent will briefly discuss the constitutional 
issues in the order in which they are mentioned in Appel-
lants' Brief, pp. 16-22. If the Court has further questio: 
regarding any other legal arguments raised in the Answers, 
-6-
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its attention is directed to the arguments made in Plain-
·tiff's Memorandum and Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum. 
DUE PROCESS 
Appellants challenge the Utah Outdoor Advertising 
Act on the due process bases that aesthetic values do not 
justify an exercise of the eminent domain power, the Act 
is overbroad, and the condemnation of Appellants' signs 
is arbitrary (Appellants' Brief, pp. 17-18). 
(1) Esthetic values justifying condemnation. 
Although this Court has not yet had occasion to rule 
on the State's right to condemn billboards under the Utah 
Outdoor Advertising Act, other states have recognized that 
highway beautification is a proper basis for exercise of 
the eminent domain power. 
In Wes Outdoor Advertising Company v. Goldberg, 55 
N.J. 347, 262 A. 2d 199 (1970), the plaintiffs contested 
the State of New Jersey's right to condemn real or personal 
property adjacent to federal-aid highways, for the statutory 
purpose of "restoration, preservation and enhancement of 
scenic beauty along the highways." The Court stated: 
We have ~o hesitancy in stating that the rest-
oration, preservation and enhancement of 
scenic beauty adjacent to public highways is 
a public use for the public welfare, filling 
-7-
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a social need, of our times. Hence, the power 
to acquire lands for that purpose is beyond 
judicial interference. 262 A. 2d at 202. 
Also the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that under a similar 
roadside beautification act, the State could constitution-
ally take a "scenic easement" which expressly provided for 
the discontinuance of nonconforming billboards within the 
restricted area; the court held this to be a proper public 
use of the land. I<amrowski v. State, 31 viis. 2d 256, 142 
N.W. 2d 793 (1966). And in Finks v. Maine State Highway 
Commission, 328 A. 2d 791 (Me. 1974), where the constitu-
tionality of condemnation actions under the Maine Roadside 
Beautification Act was contested, the court cited language 
from the Wes Outdoor Advertising and I<amrowski cases dealing 
with the question, and simply stated, "We fully agree." 32f 
A. 2d at 794. 
Of related interest are cases dealing with beautifi· 
cation and esthetic enhancement as valid bases for the exer· 
cise of the police power. It is rudimentary that the police 
power may be exercised to promote the public health, safety, 
and general welfare. The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act 
expressly seeks to serve these objectives, as well as to 
protect the public investment in highways and to preserve 
the scenic beauty of adjoining lands. U.C.A. 27-12-136.2-
-8-
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In considering the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance 
requiring the removal of unsightly material from land, this 
Court has held that esthetic enhancement is a part of the 
general welfare for police power purposes: 
Surely among the factors which may be consid-
ered in the general welfare, is the taking 
of reasonable measures to minimize discordant, 
unsightly and offensive surroundings; and to 
preserve the beauty as well as the usefullness 
of the environment. Buhler v, Stone, 533 P.2d 
292, 294 (Utah, 1975). 
Thus, the purposes of the Utah Outdoor Advertis·ing Act would 
be sufficient to justify an exercise of the State's police 
power were that pmver involved here; a fortiori, they must 
be considered as justifying an exercise of the less harsh 
. d . 2/ em~nent oma~n power.- As the court in Kamrowski v. State, 
~/ Numerous courts have upheld billboard statutes, where 
no compensation for removal of signs was offered, as 
valid exercises of the police power, on the bases of 
public safety, esthetic enhancement, furtherance of 
the public welfare, preservation of the public's right 
to privacy, economics, urban renewal, or a combination 
of these bases. E.g., Iowa Department of Transportation 
v. Nebraska-Iowa Supply Company, 272 N.W. 2d 6 (Iowa, 
1978); John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 
1272 (D. Me., 1978); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 
N.W. 2d 741 (N.D. I 1978) appeal dismissed, 99 s.ct. 
1205 (1979); Veterans of Fore~gn Wars, Post 4264 v. 
City of Steamboat Springs, 575 P. 2d 835 (Colo., 
1978) appeal dismissed, 99 S.Ct. 66 (1978); Lubbock 
Poster Company v. City of Lubbock, 569 S.W. 2d 935 
(Tex. App., 1978), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 63 (1979); 
State v. National Advertising Company, 356 So. 2d 557 
-9-
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supra, regarding a roadside beautification law, stated: 
Nhatever may be the law with respect to 
zoning restrictions based upon aesthetic 
considerations, a stronger argument can 
be made in support of the power to take 
property, in return for just compensation, 
in order to fulfill aesthetic concepts, 
than for the imposition of police power 
restrictions for such purposes. 142 N.W. 
2d at 797. (Emphasis added.) 
The Legislature has determined that valid public 
purposes will be served by the condemnation of nonconforminq 
.Y (continued) 
(La. App., 1978); Modjeska Sign Studios, Inc. v. Ber1e, 
43 N.Y. 2d 468, 373 N.E. 2d 255 (1977), appeal dismissed, 
99 S. Ct. 66 (1978); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Company, 
Inc. v. Hulse, 43 N.Y. 2d 483, 373 N.E. 2d 263 (1977), 
appeal dismissed, 99 S.Ct. 66 (1978); Donnelly Advertisir: 
Corp. of Maryland v. City of Baltimore, 279 Md. 660, 370 
A.2d 1127 (1977); John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor 
Advertising Board, 339 N.E. 2d 709 (Mass., 1975); Town o: 
Boothbay v. National Advertising Company, 347 A.2d~ 
(Me., 1975); Mississippi State Highway Commission v. 
Roberts Enterprises, Inc., 304 So. 2d 637 (Miss., 1974): 
Westfield Motor Sales Company v. Town of Westfield, 129 ' 
N.J. Super. 528, 324 A.2d 113 (1974); Art Neon Company 
v. City and County of Denver, 448 F.2d 118 (lOth Cir., 
1973), cert. den., 417 u.s. 972 (1973); Howard v. State 
Department of Highways of Colorado, 478 F.2d 581 (10~ 
C~r., 1973); Markham Advertis~ng Company v. State, 73 . 
lvash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), Appeal dismissed, 39: 
U.S. 316, reh. den., 393 U.S. 1112 (1969); Naegele Out-
door Advertising Company of Minnesota v. Village of j 
Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W. 2d 206 (1968); ~' 
v. Diamond Motors, 50 Haw. 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); ~ 
v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. App., 1964); Ghaster Prope;· 
Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E. 2d 328 (196' 
-10-
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signs under the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, and that such 
an exercise of the eminent domain power is compatible with 
the greatest public good and least private injury. The 
district court properly refrained from substituting its 
judgment in the matter. 
(2) Overbreadth, arbitrariness. Appellants' further 
due process arguments ignore the reasonable and orderly method 
of regulation set up by the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, pur-
suant to and in furtherance of legislative findings that such 
regulation serves the public safety and welfare. U.C.A. 27-
12-136.2, a section of the Act, states: 
The purpose of this act is to provide the 
statutory basis for the regulation of outdoor 
advertising consistent with zoning principles 
and standards and the public policy of this 
state in providing public safety, health, wel-
fare, convenience and enjoyment of public travel, 
to protect the public investment in such highways, 
and to ensure that information in the specific 
interest of the traveling public is presented 
safely and effectively. 
The Act then specifies what signs may and may not be permitted 
along controlled highways under the Act, U.C.A. 27-12-136.4, 
and provides for the removal of nonconforming signs by 
eminent domain or other lawful means, U.C.A. 27-12-136.11. 
Respondent submits that the Act, on its face, serves impor-
tant, articulated goals of safety, welfare, and financial 
and esthetic preservation by means of a well-defined system 
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of regulation, and that Appellants suggested nothing which 
would have justified the lower court's acting as a super-
legislature by ruling the statutory scheme unreasonable. 
No dispute exists in this case as to the fact that Appel-
lants' signs are nonconforming under the Act. 
Regarding Appellants' charge of arbitrariness, it 
is the Utah Legislature, and not Respondent, which promul-
gated the statutory criteria for nonconforming signs; also, ' 
evidence before the lower court indicated that more than 
87% of nonconforming signs had been acquired for removal 
prior to hearing in these cases (Affidavit of Dean W. Hol-
brook, appended to Plaintiff's Reply Hemorandum). There 
simply is no legal substance in Appellants' due process 
arguments. (See also Plaintiff's Memorandum, pp. 5-7, for 
decisions from other jurisdictions upholding outdoor ad-
vertising laws under due process attack.) 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
Appellants argue that the Act's distinction between 
the permissibility of signs in commercial and noncommercial 
areas may not be reasonable, and therefore violates the 
equal protection doctrine. 
As to any legislative classification, including the' 
pertaining to outdoor advertising, the equal protection 
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standard set out by the United States Supreme Court in 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 489, 
75 S.Ct. 461, 465 (1955), applies: 
The problem of legislative classification is 
a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire 
definition. Evils in the same field may be 
of different dimensions and proportions, re-
quiring different remedies. Or so the legis-
lature may think •... Or the reform may take 
one step at a time, addressing itself to the 
phase of the problem which seems most acute 
to the legislative mind ...• The legislature 
may select one phase of one field and apply 
a remedy there, neglecting the others ..•• 
The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause 
goes no further than the invidious discrimin-
ation. 
In the present cases, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose 
that the Utah Legislature concluded that regulation of out-
door advertising along interstate and primary highways 
would serve the public safety and welfare, by protecting 
the public investment in such highways and preserving the 
scenic beauty of adjoining lands. The means adopted by the 
Utah Act are reasonably related to that purpose, and apply 
across-the-board to all who, like Appellants, own nonconform-
ing signs. The district court properly refrained from 
second-guessing the Legislature's choice of statutory means 
in effectuating valid public purposes, and Appellants' 
agrument on the basis of equal protection must also fail. 
-13-
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In addition, the Court's attention is drawn to 
pages 8-11 of Plaintiff's Memorandum, which discusses oilier 
states' outdoor advertising laws which have been upheld 
under equal protection attack. 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Appellants also aver that the Utah Act violates 
free speech (Appellants' Brief, p. 19), and in support of 
this contention, cite one 1977 unpublished opinion from a 
California trial court. This argument ignores repeated 
holdings by state and federal courts, including the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, that billboard la\vS do not violate 
First Amendment guarantees. Most recently, in Metromedia, , 
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 23 Cal.3d 762,592 P.2d 728 (1919'! 
the California Court upheld a city ordinance that, far more 1 
harshly than the Utah Act, would ban substantially all off· 
site billboards from an entire city. The Court reviewed 
. . t i 
other jurisdicitions' decisions, and found that a "unan~ml Y
1 
of published decisions supports the proposition that such 
an ordinance does not abridge freedom of speech." Id. at 
742. While a rehearing has been granted in Metromedia, ~, 
at 728, Respondent submits that the reasoning of the major· i 
i ty and concurring opinions is even more persuasive in the 1 
present case, where a less harsh regulatory scheme is at 
issue. 
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The Metromedia court cited Suffolk Outdoor Ad-
vertising Company v. Hulse, 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263 
(1977), in which a community-wide ban on off-site bill-
boards was upheld under First Amendment attack. An appeal 
from that decision was dismissed for want of a substantial 
federal question by the U.S. Supreme Court, 99 S.Ct. 66 
(1978). The Metromedia court stated: 
Since the Supreme Court regards such a dis-
missal as a decision on the merits (Hicks v. 
Miranda (1975) 422 u.s. 332, 95 s.ct. 2281, 
45 L.Ed.2d 225), we conclude that the high-
court has resolved that its commercial speech 
cases are not inconsistent with ordinances 
prohibiting off-site billboards. The dismis-
sal of the appeal in Suffolk Outdoor Advert~s­
ing authoritatively establishes that such ordi-
nances do not v~olate the F~rst Amendment. 
592 P.2d at 739 (emphas~s added). 
Precisely the same principle applies to the U.S. 
Supreme Court's dismissal on the merits of an appeal in 
Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.l'l. 2d 741 (N.D., 1978), 
appeal dismissed, 99 S.Ct. 1205 (1979). In that case, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a state outdoor advertis-
ing act, identical in substance to the Utah Outdoor Ad-
vertising Act, and held that the act did not violate the 
First Amendment (see Plaintiff's Memorandum, pp. 15-16). 
The Metromedia court also found that the ordinance 
did not seek to suppress the content of any advertiser's 
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message; served significant governmental interests (i.e., 
traffic safety and community esthetics) unrelated to the 
suppression of free speech; and left open adequate alter-
nate means of communication; and therefore did not abridge 
freedom of speech. 592 P.2d at 740. Respondent submits 
that this analysis is of even greater validity when ap-
plied to the Utah Act, involving, as it does, the prohi-
bition of billboards only in certain defined areas. 
Also, in State v. Lotze, 92 Wash.2d, 52, 593 P.2d 
811, appeal filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3250 (1979), an opinion poo-
lished since memoranda were filed with the district court in 
this case, the Washington Supreme Court held that the Wash-
ington outdoor advertising law, identical in all pertinent 
substantive aspects to the Utah Act, does not violate the 
First Amendment, even when applied to signs containing non-
commercial, political messages. The Court found that the 
State's concern with traffic safety was sufficiently com-
pelling to outweigh the "minimal restraint placed on ad-
vertising by the law," and that the "statutory scheme rep-
resents a reasonable place and manner limitation on speech 
leaving ample alternative channels of communication .... " 
Id. at 815 
Rather than providing a recitation here of the dozen 
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or so recent, well-reasoned state and federal court de-
cisions which hold that billboard regulations do no vio-
late freedom of speech, Respondent directs the Court's 
attention to the cases cited at pages 12-18 of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum. Of particular precedential value here are the 
decisions in John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 
1272 (D.Me., 1978), Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W. 
2d 741 (N.D., 1978), appeal dismissed, 99 S.Ct. 1205 (1979), 
State v. National Advertising Company, 356 So.2d 557 (La. 
App., 1978), and Howard v. State Department of Highways of 
Colorado, 478 F.2d 581 (lOth Cir., 1973), in which beauti-
fication acts substantially the same as Utah's, enacted 
pursuant to the-federal highway beautification statute 
(23 U.S.C. 131), have been uniformly upheld as not viola-
tive of freedom of speech. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 13 
Article XIII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution 
state in pertinent part: 
The proceeds from the imposition of any license 
tax, registration fee, driver education 
tax, or other charge related to the op-
eration of any motor vehicle upon any pub-
lic highway in this state, and the proceeds 
from the imposition of any excise tax on 
gasoline or _other liquid motor fuel used 
for propelling such vehicles, except for 
statutory refunds and adjustments allowed 
thereunder and for costs of collection and 
-17-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
administration, shall be used exclusively for 
highway purposes as follows: 
(1) The construction, improvement, repair and 
maintenance of city streets, county roads, and 
state highways, including but not restricted 
to payment for property taken for or damaged 
by rights of way, and for administrative costs 
necessarily incurred for said purposes ...• 
Appellants have contended that expenditures under the Out-
door Advertising Act would constitute an unlawful diversion 
of state highway funds under this section (App·ellants 1 Brie:.! 
I 
p. 20; Eleventh Defense in Answer). 
Appellants apparently overlook the fact that state 
highway funds r.1ay be expended for the "improvement •.. and 
maintenance of ... state highways ...• " The clear purpose 
of this section is to prevent the diversion of highway funds 
to non-highway-related expenditures. On the other hand, 
expenditures authorized under the Utah Outdoor Advertising 
Act are intended to improve and maintain the safety and 
scenic beauty of Utah 1 s highways. The breadth of the term: · 
"improvement" and "maintenance" in the constitutional pro· 
vision indicates that its purpose is not to prevent the 
Legislature from directing expenditures validly related ~ 
protecting the public investment in highways and enhancing ' 
the safety and enjoyment of highway travel. 
The purposes of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, ' 
as enumerated in U.C.A. 27-12-136.2, are, inter alia, to 
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provide for the regulation of outdoor advertising in the 
interests of the public's safety, welfare, and conveni-
ence and enjoyment of public travel;" 
••• to protect the public investment in such 
highways, to preserve the natural scenic 
beauty of lands bordering on such highways, 
and to ensure that information in the specific 
interest of the traveling public is presented 
safely and effectively. 
Plaintiff submits that these purposes clearly fall 
within the purview of highway "improvement and maintenance." 
It cannot be reasonably argued that Article XIII, Section 
13 entirely prevents the Utah Department of Transportation 
from making expenditures for the safety, convenience, and 
enjoyment of highway users, or the preservation of the 
economic and scenic value of highways in the State. 
In Newman v. Hjelle, 133 N.W.2d 549 (N.D., 1965), 
an argument substantially the same as Defendant's was re-
jecte'd by the North Dakota Supreme Court. There, a taxpayer 
sought to enjoin the expenditure of state highway funds 
for the acquisition of outdoor advertising outside of the 
highway right-of-way, alleging that such an expenditure 
would violate Article 56 of the North Dakota Constitution. 
That provision, very similar to the Utah provision, states 
~hat proceeds from motor fuel taxes and from license and reg-
istration fees are to be expended "solely for construction, 
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repair and maintenance of public highways ..•. " The Court 
stated: 
It is clear the purpose of the amendment was 
to prevent any use of the earmarked revenues 
for anything but highway purposes and not to 
restrict the terms of the amendment by a nar-
row construction of the purpose for which the 
revenues may be used within the area designated. 
Id. at 557. 
On its face, the Utah constitutional provision serves the 
same purpose, and a similar rule of construction should be 
applied to the Utah provision. It should further be 
stressed that, on the basis of the constitutional language 
alone, the Utah provision gives even stronger justification 
for the validity of the proposed condemnation expenditure 
than the North Dakota provision examined in Newman v. 
Hjelle. The latter section allowed expenditures only "for 
construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of 
public highways •.•. " The Utah constitutional provision, 
on the other hand, allows expenditures of highway funds 
for the "construction, improvement, repair and maintenance 
of . • . state highways •... " As indica ted above, it is 
evident that the purposes of the Utah Outdoor Advertising 
Act (traffic safety, convenience and enjoyment of travel, 
esthetic enhancement) fall well within the broad standard 
of highway "improvement." Expenditures under the Utah 
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Outdoor Advertising Act do not violate the constitutional 
provision, and the district court was fully justified in 
finding the state's right to condemn unimpaired on this 
basis. 
ESTOPPEL 
Appellants have also argued that Respondent should 
be estopped from condemning the subject signs by reason of 
the previous issuance of permits for the signs (Appellants' 
Brief, p. 20; Twelfth Defense in Answer). The district 
court properly rejected this argument as a matter of law. 
First, the general rule regarding the application 
of equitable esto.ppel to governmental actions has been 
stated as follows: 
An equitable estoppel ordinarily may not be 
invoked against a government or public 
agency functioning in its governmental ca-
pacity; but where the elements of an estop-
pel are present it may be asserted against 
the government when acting in its proprietary 
capacity. 31 C.J.S., Estoppel 138, p. 675. 
An argument similar to Defendant's was advanced by 
the plaintiffs in John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. 
Supp. 1272 (D. Me., 1978). There it was claimed that the 
State of Maine should be estopped from requiring removal 
of off-premise signs for which permits had been issued 
under previous legislation. Rejecting that argument, the 
court noted its adherence to "the general rule that when 
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the legislature acts in its governmental or sovereign 
capacity, as opposed to a business or proprietary role, 
the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable." 453 F.Supp. 
at 1282. 
In the present case, it is indisputable that the 
State is acting in its sovereign, and not in its proprie-
tary, capacity. The simple fact that Plaintiff has been 
legislatively authorized to exercise the eminent domain 
power demonstrates that the State is performing a govern-
mental function in regulating billboards, and not merely 
acting as a property owner. 
Second, the mere fact that Appellants may have 
previously received permits for their signs, in accordance 
with the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, provides no basis 
for invoking equitable estoppel. By renewing Appellants' 
permits, in accordance with statutory requirement (see 
U.C.A. 27-12-136.7), Respondent certainly made no repre-
sentation that Appellants' billboards could remain in place 
forever. Appellants must be presumed to have known that 
their nonconforming signs were subject to condemnation at 
any time under u.c.A. 27-12-136.11. 
This Court has previously stated: 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not 
operate in favor of one who has knowledge 
of the essential facts or who has convenient 
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and available means of obtaining such knowl-
edge. Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 
P.2d 695, 697 n. 4 (Utah, 1976). 
In the present case, Respondent has only followed the pro-
cedures dictated by statute in issuing licenses (U.C.A. 
27-12-136.7) until such time that Appellant~' nonconforming 
signs could be condemned (U.C.A. 27-12-136.10-11), and no 
suggestion has been made by Appellants that such procedure 
was not followed. Sign owners must be presumed to have 
available means of learning what the statutes on signs pro-
vide. In short, no basis has been suggested or exists for 
estopping these actions, and the lower court properly dis-
regarded Appellants' argument on this score. 
Other courts' decisions, rejecting efforts to estop 
enforcement of billboard laws, are discussed in Plaintiff's 
Memorandum, at page 28. 
23 u.s.c. 13l(o) 
Appellants seek to rely on 23 U.S.C. 131(o), a sec-
tion of the federal highway beautification act, which states: 
The Secretary may approve the request o£ a 
State to permit retention in specific areas 
defined by such State of directional signs, 
displays, and devices lawfully erected un-
der State law in force at the time of their 
erection which do not conform to the require-
ments of subsection (c), where such signs, 
displays, and devices are in existence on 
the date of enactment of this subsection and 
where the State demonstrates that such signs, 
displays, and devices (1) provide directional 
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information about goods and services in the 
interest of the travelling public, and (2) 
are such that removal would work a substan-
tial economic hardship in such defined area. 
Appellants advance the peculiar argument that, by not mak-
ing application under this section, the State has failed to 
exhaust its administrative remedies, and that this so-called 
failure somehow adversely affects Respondent's eminent do-
main power (Appellants" Brief, p. 20). 
Respondent confesses itself at an utter loss to 
determine any way in which section 13l(o) vitiates the 
State's authority to condemn nonconforming signs. The fed-
eral statute permits states to apply for hardship exemptions 
for certain signs, if the states choose to do so, but does 
not mandate such requests, or make the states' power to 
condemn nonconforming signs contingent upon exercise of 
the discretionary privilege granted in section 13l(o). 
That any application under 13l(o) was intended to 
be left to the states' discretion is attested both by a 
reasonable reading of the statutory language itself and by 
the section's legislative history. In 1976, when the U.S. 
Senate considered the bill containing section 13l(o), the 
following exchange occurred while Senator Bentsen, chairman 
of the Sub-Committee on Transportation of the Committee on 
Public Works, reported on the conference cornrni ttee' s consk 
eration of the proposed amendments: 
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MR. STEVENSON. Section 122(b) (o) amends 
section 131 of title 23, United States 
Code, by adding that the Secretary of 
Transportation may approve the request of 
a State to permit retention in specific 
areas of directional signs providing in-
formation about goods and services. 
Do I understand correctly that a State may, 
if it so chooses, elect not to permit such 
signs? 
MR. BENTSEN. State 
rna choose s. 122 nc~o~n~g~.~R'-e~c~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~added). 
Senator Baker, the ranking minority member of the Public 
Works Committee, and a member of the conference committee 
which considered section 13l(o), stated: 
We also added a new provision to assist 
those areas in a State which may suffer 
severe economic hardship if all existing 
signs are required to be removed. This 
would permit States to define these areas 
and ask the Secretary of Transportation 
to permit retention of billboards which 
would otherwise be illegal. The measure 
is intended to relieve adverse economic 
impacts throughout an area. It is not 
designed to provide relief to individual 
businesses which claim possible economic 
detriment as a result of sign removal. 
Id. at 10746 (emphasis added). 
Thus, it was clearly contemplated that section 13l(o) would 
permit states to apply for a hardship exemption, but no 
mention is made of requiring states to take any action at 
all, including the promulgation of rules and regulations. 
No legislative history or statutory language of which 
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Respondent is aware would justify the interpretation of 
section 13l(o) advanced by Appellants in this case. 
Respondent has previously considered the exemp-
tion provided for in section 13l(o), and has declined to 
apply for any such exemption. The federal statute makes 
no requirement of any affirmative action by the State, and 
has no effect on the State's power to condemn nonconform-
ing outdoor advertising signs. 
Finally, Appellants cite State v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western Railroad Company, 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P.2d 
926 (1958), as supportive of the proposition that, "where 
challenges are made to the right to condemn, a condemnor 
will not be granted an order of immediate occupancy." 
(Defendant's Memorandum, p. 14). The D.&R.G.W. case is in-
apposite here for several reasons: (1) In that case, boili 
condemnor and condemnee were empowered to exercise the 
right of eminent domain, and the case therefore centered 
on the question of highest and best use of the subject 
property. (2) However, the condmnor at the hearing on 
its motion for an order of immediate occupancy failed to 
request any determination as to whether the proposed im-
provement would constitute a higher and better use than 
the existing improvement. (3) The D.&R.G.W. Court indi-
cated that questions of a right to condemn generally would 
not interfere with issuance of an order of immediate 
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occupancy. Summarizing that case, the Court stated: 
Both plaintiff and defendant are empowered to 
exercise the right of eminent domain. This 
case, therefore, is somewhat of a rarity, re-
quiring a determination as to whether the 
exercise of the one power or the other will 
better promote the public good, -- a situa-
tion not involved in substantially all con-
demnation cases in this state, where the 
sovereign is seeking condemnation of property 
belonging to one not enjoying such power. In 
the latter type of case it has been considered 
routine to grant motions for immediate occu-
pancy, since generally it is quite obvious 
that no question of higher and better use will 
or can arise or that the right to condemn is 
debatable. 
The granting of a motion for immediate occu-
pancy has been held by this court primarily to 
be one directed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court, reversible only because of ob-
vious abuse there; that the order resulting 
from such motion is interlocutory in nature, 
and that the matter of determining any right 
to condemn is one for consideration at the 
trial at which the issues generally are deter-
mined. 8 Utah 2d at 238 (emphasis added). 
Respondent submits that the district court properly 
found Appellants' objections to be without foundation, and 
ruled as a matter of law that the State has the right to 
condemn the subject signs. Nevertheless, even assuming 
arguendo that Appellant's constitutional claims could be 
shown to have some viability, both U.C.A. 78-34-9, the 
statute governing orders of immediate occupancy, and the 
D.&R.G.W. case indicate that these issued may be determined 
at trial, and that an order of immediate occupancy may, in 
the trial court's discretion, be granted in the meantime. 
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In su::-., the record indicates t~at the constitu-
tional and legal objections raised by Appellants were 
fully briefed prior to argument on the motion for an order 
of irmnediate occupancy; that Appellants were free to offer 
whatever factual evidence they felt was pertinent to those 
issues at the hearing in the matter; and that, as c. result, 
the district court could and did properly rule that the 
State had made out a prima facie showing of it? right to 
take, and that the objections raised by Appellants were 
not sufficient to rebut that showing. 
B. 
RESPONDENT HADE A PROPER SHOWING AS TO THE 
REASONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ORDERS OF IMMEDI-
ATE OCCUPANCY, BASED UPON THE STATUTORY AIHS 
OF THE UTAH OUTDOOR ADVERTISING ACT, AND IT 
WAS WELL WITHIN THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISCRE-
TION TO GRANT THE ORDERS. 
U.C.A. 78-34-9, as indicated above, requires a 
condemnor seeking an order of immediate occupancy to show, 
by affidavit or otherwise, the value of the property sought 
to be condemned, and the reasons for a speedy occupation. 
As to the first requirement, Respondent submitted the 
affidavits of Glenwood B. Larrabee and Ward c. Ragner, 
testifying to the value of the subject signs (see Plain-
tiff's Reply Hemorandum in each case). No dispute exists 
between the parties as to this requirement having been 
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fulfilled. 
As to the second requirement, that of showing the 
reasons for a speedy occupation, Respondent submits that 
the district court had before it ample showing as to the 
reasons for immediate occupancy to sustain its discretion-
ary order granting occupancy. 
First, it should be stressed that, unlike the large 
majority of condemnation actions, in the instant cases 
the necessity of condemning a certain specifically defined 
class of property for articulated public purposes is man-
dated by the statute which grants the eminent domain power. 
That is, the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act directs that 
nonconforming signs be removed, by purchase, condemnation, 
or other legal means, in furtherance of the purposes set 
out in U.C.A. 27-12-136.2; this is not a case in which a 
condemnor has discretion in planning the design, timing, 
and location of a public improvement, so that the necessity 
or design of the improvement would be validly open to judi-
cial scrutiny. In this case, the Legislature has deter-
mined that the removal of defined nonconforming uses will 
further the public purposes set out in U. C.A. 27-12-136.2; 
Appellants have not disputed the fact that their signs are 
nonconforming, and given the legislative mandate involved, 
no question of the ultimate necessity of condemnation 
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viably exists in this case. 
Thus, the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act is in the 
nature of a zoning regulation, requiring the removal of 
certain nonconforming uses after an amortization period 
(U.C.A. 27-12-136.10) in furtherance of the "public safety, 
health, [and) welfare" and "consistent with zoning principl' 
and standards ... " (U.C.A. 27-12-136.2). It is true that 
the Act provides for compensation to be paid for noncon-
forming signs, in addition to an amortization period, but 
this does not change the basic nature of the Act as a zon-
ing law. The district court's order was fully consonant 
with the policy of the law to eliminate nonconforming uses 
as rapidly as is feasible under the law. 
Because nonconforming uses and structures, 
so long as they exist, prevent the full reali-
zation of the zoning plan, the spirit of zon-
ing is, and has been, to restrict, rather than 
increase, such nonconformities, and to elimi-
nate such uses as speedily as possible. 
2 Rathdopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning 
(3d ed.), ch. 62. 
In short, in considering the need for immediate occupancy, 
the district court had before it a legislative determina-
tion that the removal of nonconforming signs would serve 
important public purposes. Appellants' implication that 
an order of immediate occupancy is only appropriate to 
avoid direct pecuniary loss (Appellants' Brief, pp. 4-8) 
ignores the other valid interests served by the Outdoor 
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Advertising Act -- i.e., the protection of public safety 
and of the public investment in interstate and primary 
highways; enhancement of the enjoyment of public travel; 
and preservation of the natural scenic beauty of the lands 
bordering on controlled highways. Extensiv~ evidence that 
these aims are served by the removal of nonconforming 
signs would have been superfluous, since that determination 
has already been made by the Legislature and was binding 
upon the district court. 
Second, the district court had before it in each 
case a resolution by the Utah Department of Transportation, 
whereby the Department found and determined: 
... the public interest and necessity require 
that an outdoor advertising sign and the 
right to maintain the same upon the real 
property, hereinafter described, be termi-
nated by removal of said sign structure. 
The removal of said sign structure and the 
termination of the right to thereafter main-
tain a controlled outdoor advertising struc-
ture and sign on the site will be most 
compatible with the greatest public good and 
the least private injury and carries out and 
fulfills the requirements of the law as de-
clared in Title 27, Chapter 12, Section 136.2, 
Paragraph No. 1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. (See Complaint in each case.) 
In each resolution, the Department also requests that the 
Utah Attorney General's Office seek an order of immediate 
occupancy, "permitting said Department to . • • take posses-
sion of and remove the outdoor advertising structure and 
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sign described in this Resolution." 
The district court therefore had before it, not 
only a legislative determination that the removal of non-
conforming signs serves certain public purposes, but also 
an administrative determination that the removal of Appel-
lants' particular signs would serve the public interest ~d 
necessity, would be compatible with the greatest public 
good and the least private injury, would fulfill the pur-
poses of U.C.A. 27-12-136.2, and should be effectuated by 
means of an order of immediate occupancy. It is well set-
tled that substantial judicial deference will be shown to 
a governmental condemnor's determination of the necessity 
of taking property for a public improvement, properly 
expressed by resolution. Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 
(Utah, 1975). Respondent submits that the district court 
could and did properly consider the Department's adminis-
trative resolutions as probative of the need for removal 
of Appellants' signs by means of an order of immediate 
occupancy. 
Finally, the district court had before it further 
evidence of the reasons for speedy occupation in the Affi-
davit of Dean 1'<. Holbrook, appended to Plaintiff's Reply 
Memorandum in each case. Mr. Holbrook's Affidavit indi-
cated that, as of January 15, 1979, two months prior to tlli 
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hearing on the orders, Respondent had acquired for removal 
2,167 signs which were nonconforming and compensable under 
the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, in addition to having 
removed some 7,550 illegal, noncompensable signs; 321 non-
conforming signs remained as of that date. Of the noncon-
forming signs which remained standing, condemnation suits 
involving thirty-one signs had at that time been filed; 
orders of immediate occupancy had been granted·as to six-
teen of such signs, and denied as to six. Mr. Holbrook's 
Affidavit indicated that Respondent intended "to continue to 
seek removal of such [nonconforming] signs through condemna-
tion in as expeditious a manner as possible." (In light of 
all this, Appellants' assertion that "Plaintiff has chosen 
to ignore more than two hundred and fifty (250) other non-
conforming signs throughout the State" (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 10) is rather misleading, to say the least.) 
The facts that Respondent had acquired for removal 
nearly 90% of the nonconforming signs which existed when the 
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act took effect, and nearly all of 
the illegal signs which had existed since that date, were 
thus before the district court. Based upon ~his, Respondent 
argued that orders of immediate occupancy in sign condemna-
cases are appropriate means of ensuring that the removal of 
-33-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nonconforming signs may continue in an orderly and reason-
ably expeditious way; and that this should hold true 
particularly where, as in the present cases, no viable 
objection as to the right to take or the nonconforming 
status of the signs has been raised, and the matter of 
compensation will be determined at trial. (Plaintiff's 
Reply Memorandum, p. 7). 
Respondent also readily conceded that a sign 
owner may have or believe he has a legitimate dispute with 
the State as to the amount of compensation to which he is 
entitled for his condemned property. This fact alone, how-
ever, does not justify a denial of an order of immediate 
occupancy, which denial would allow nonconforming signs 
additional months and years in which to remain standing 
while a condemnation action languishes on through discovery 
a trial, and an appeal. Questions of compensation are r~ 
served for trial and are not affected by the granting of 
an order of immediate occupancy. U.C.A. 78-34-9. The 
public has a valid interest in the removal of nonconform-
ing signs, for the purposes enunciated in U.C.A. 27-12-
136.2; in weighing the equities of the case, the public's 
interest in the protection of its highway investment and 
in the enhancement of safe automobile travel and of the 
state's scenic beauty could properly be deemed to outweig: 
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the interest of any private sign owner in delaying the 
removal of nonconforming signs for the duration of what 
may be a lengthy condemnation proceeding. 
In sum, Respondent submits that the district court 
had before it adequate evidence, showing reasons for orders 
of immediate occupancy, and those orders should now be af-
firmed. 
III. 
THIS COURT HAS TRADITIONALLY DEFERRED TO 
THE DISTRICT COURTS' DISCRETION IN THE GRANT-
ING OF ORDERS OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY, PARTICU-
LARLY WHERE, AS HERE, THE RECORD REVEALS NO 
OBVIOUS ABUSE OF THAT DISCRETION. 
As previously noted, the following standard governs 
the review by this Court of orders of immediate occupancy: 
The granting of a motion for immediate occu-
pancy has been held by this court primarily 
to be one directed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court, reversible only because 
of obvious abuse thereof; that the order re-
sulting from such motion is interlocutory in 
nature, and that the matter of determining 
any right to condemn is one for consideration 
at the trial at which the issues generally are 
determined. State v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company, supra, 8 Utah 2d 
at 238. 
Based upon U.C.A. 78-34-9, the Court has also stated, " ••• on 
a motion for immediate occupancy the trial court is empowered 
to grant or deny the motion according to the equity of the 
case," Bountiful v. Swift, supra, 535 P.2d at 1238; and only 
recently, the Court reiterated, "Where such an order is sup-
ported by ample evidence it is not arbitrary and will not 
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be disturbed on appeal." Utah Department of Transporta-
tion v. Fuller, docket no. 16404 (Utah, filed November 
14, 1979). 
Respondent submits that, in weighing the equities 
in the present cases, the district court could reasonably 
conclude that the public's interest in safety, scenic 
preservation, and protection of its investment i~ public 
highways would outweigh the alleged monetary harm to be 
suffered by Appellants. In light of this, and the record 
and evidence before the district court, no abuse of dis-
cretion is manifest, and this Court should thus defer to 
the discretion of the district court in the matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Orders of immediate occupancy are appropriate for 
the courts' consideration in condemnation actions of this 
kind, as evidenced by the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act's 
incorporation of the provisions of Title 78, chapter 34 
(U.C.A. 27-12-136.11, 78-34-9). 
In the instant cases, because Respondent's right 
to take was controverted, Respondent made a prima facie 
showing on legal grounds of its right to take, a showing 
that was not successfully rebutted by Appellants. In addi· 
tion, the district court had before it the Legislature's 
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determination that the removal of nonconforming signs 
would serve important public purposes (U.C.A. 27-12-136.2); 
copies of valid administrative resolutions determining 
that removal of Appellants' signs would serve those public 
purposes, and requesting that orders of immediate occu-
pancy be obtained; and affidavits evidencing (1) the value 
of Appellants' signs and (2) the fact that removal of 
Appellants' signs would be in furtherance of an orderly 
acquisition and removal scheme undertaken by Respondent, 
pursuant to which over 87% of nonconforming signs had been 
previously acquired, and which was continuing at that time. 
(These cases thus differ from the great majority of con-
demnation cases, since here, the statutory enactment was 
in the nature of a zoning ordinance, and the question of 
public necessity was conclusively determined by the Legis-
lature, and was not subject to administrative discretion.) 
Given this record, all statutory and case law prerequisites 
for an order of immediate occupancy were fulfilled, and 
the district court had before it ample evidence of "the 
reasons for ... a speedy occupation." U.C.A., 78-34-9. 
In its weighing of the equities, the district court could 
well have concluded that the public good to be served by 
immediate removal of the signs outweighed any damages which 
would accrue to Appellants. 
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Motions for immediate occupancy have been held to 
be directed primarily to the discretion of the trial court. 
Respondent submits that no abuse of discretion is manifest 
in these cases, and respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the orders of immediate occupancy granted by the 
district court. 
DATED this ;;J-#h day of December, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
~~ STEHENJ~ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to 
Thomas T. Billings, of and for PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER, 
Attorneys for Appellants, 79 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 on this ;:L/J/1 day of December, 1979. 
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